20101017

By the way,

Has it ever occurred to You, my Fair Reader (or have You ever come to ponder such), to whom exactly is it, that, in essence, all my questions are directed? Who is it that I'm talking to, here, in (or, perhaps even, through) these posts?

For, as far as the linguistic form goes, You, the Reader, might conceive yourself as the Recipient (along with all the other Readers), to which, then, I point out that, at no time, should the Reader lay His/Her trust on any form on this forum. (Regardless, whether this note -- this scribble for a 'reminder' that's hardly even consistent... whether it, by its nature, be more an expression of a 'sigh' -- a one of sheer nonschalance, it would, moreover, seem -- than an honestly given advice.)

So that, for example, when I contradict claims of some previously published texts carrying my signature, it might, in fact, be Your mannerism that's got entangled, not at all mine.

"Why -- then you must be writing for the joy of writing itself, is that right?"
(So that, in that case there would be no definite recipient, in the first place.)

Sure I am, but not solely 'for that reason'.

"Well, let me guess -- it's just you, and no-one else?! And to Hell with Reasons!"

I kind of like that -- "to Hell with Reasons" -- yeah! That's the spirit, alright.
Still, that's not how it is, in together. Not "just" me, no. There's more to it than that -- and, in a sense, less to it, as well.

It's not a riddle. There's no answer.

But You can fare far, and You can fare close.

--

By 'forms', then, in this context, I mean forms in the most general sense, not just the pronominal functions -- or the forms of linguistics, taken all together, to which I'd include the ones of 'purely logical' in nature. The concept of form -- as ambiguous as it might appear, even after a long thought, it is (and, after a critical inspection, still remains) a critical concept in understanding the (human) cultural existence in general, and especially, that in relation to its defining physical and animal features. So I might elucidate it at some later time, especially, as I have filled hundreds of sheets on this very issue during the years.

"Mannerisms", as I used the concept in one previous connection already, do, of course, reach up to the Linguistic, and -- in fact -- even up to the very core of our logic -- which comprises of the most fundamental rules of, but also to our linguistic practices, since they coincide with the very possibility of such practices. (Take another logic -- but you won't get the same 'World' along with it.) When two fundamental logical forms are irreconcilable, the 'ground' for the choice is purely practical. -- which then comes down to the fact, that exist no argumentative grounds for one choice or the other -- and that, moreover, in all contexts of this sort, no concept of reality or truth is applicable. Thus it so stands, that only when a certain Mannerism has succeed to prove itself relevant in some timely sense -- can it make a claim for, and be integrated with the timeless nature of logical rules and which, to be sure, carry on to other, formal functions of linguistic practices in general -- as the previous 'issue' with pronomines already brought out.

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